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WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION, FERTILITY RATES, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

by

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WOMEN'S LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION, FERTILITY RATES, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

Monica Townson

1. Introduction

Since the 1960s, women have been streaming on to the labour market. Twenty years ago, only 31 per cent of adult women (that is women aged 25 or older) participated in the paid labour force. By 1986, more than 52 per cent of women who were 25 or older were in the work force (Table 1). The most remarkable changes have been in the work force activity of married women. In the early 1950s, only 11 per cent of married women were employed outside their homes.[1] By the time of the 1981 population census, close to 51 per cent of all married women participated in the work force.[2]

But even these figures are misleading, because they include women of all ages, and there are now some significant differences in the lifetime work patterns of women of different generations. Women now in their late forties, fifties and sixties were the mothers of the baby-boom generation. When these women were of childbearing age, the typical mother had four children. She usually dropped out of the work force when she got married, or just before her first child was born, and remained at home as a full-time homemaker, probably until the youngest child was safely in school. She then perhaps returned to the work force, often in a part-time job. Less than 46 per cent of married women in the age group 45-64 participated in the work force in 1986 (Table 21).

All indications are that the younger generation of women, those now in their twenties and thirties, no longer follow this pattern. Fertility rates have dropped to less than 1.7 children per woman, and women no longer drop out of the work force for a number of years while their children are young. In 1986, for instance, more than 70 per cent of all married women of childbearing age (that is between the ages of 20 and 44) participated in the paid labour force (Table 26).

Perhaps the most remarkable change, experienced in Canada as well as in many other industrialized countries, has been the increase in the labour force participation of mothers with very young children. In 1986, 56 per cent of all mothers in Canada with children under the age of three were in the work force (Table 17). In addition, contrary to public perception, most mothers who work for pay while their children are very young have full-time jobs. Of those mothers with children under the age of three who were employed in 1986, 66 per cent worked full-time for pay (Table 17).

What has attracted women into the work force? A number of reasons have been suggested for women's ever-increasing participation rates. Higher education levels may provide more incentive for women to work outside the home, although some economists have argued that women who are most educated place a higher value on caring for their children themselves and are, therefore, more likely to remain at home.[3]

The availability of work had undoubtedly also played a role. In this respect, observers point to the expansion of the service sector (where many women work) as a major factor in the increased employment of women. The expansion of part-time employment in recent years has been noted by some observers, who argue that this phenomenon also acts as a spur to women's employment outside the home, since it allows them to combine paid employment with their family responsibilities.

Perhaps most important of all has been the finding of many studies that "the presence of children (and particularly the presence of children younger than six years of age) substantially reduces both the probability that a woman will work and her expected hours of work, if she does work."[4] The corollary to this finding, of course, is that since women now have fewer children, they are more likely to participate in the paid work force, and may do so for longer periods of time than women of the previous generation.

None of these explanations for women's increased work force participation is entirely satisfactory. Even taken together, they appear inadequate to account for the magnitude of the changes that have taken place. If the presence of children under six inhibits women's work force participation, for instance, why is it that in the past ten years the labour force participation of mothers of children under the age of three has risen from under 32 per cent to 56 per cent – a 75 per cent increase – and this despite the unavailability of sufficient licenced child-care services for the children of these families (Table 17)?

If part-time work has lured women from their homes because they find it a convenient way to combine homemaking with paid employment, how is it that 76 per cent of married women in the age group 25-34 (the prime childbearing years) who were employed in 1986 had full-time jobs (Table 22)?

In fact, women's increasing labour force participation appears to have been something of a conundrum to many economists. In an exhaustive study of the labour market, published in 1976, the Economic Council of Canada predicted that labour force participation rates would increase at a much slower rate in the future "because many of the women who want to work are now in the labour force."[5] There was no obvious basis for this statement. At the time it was made, 51 per cent of married women in the age group 20-44 were working outside their homes. Eleven years later, in 1986, that percentage had risen to more than 70 per cent (Table 11).

Studies have consistently underestimated the strength of women's increasing labour force participation. Econometric models have generally focused on the measurable determinants of the supply of female labour: the presence of children; the income level of husbands; the educational level of husbands and of women themselves; and the relationship between women's wages and hours of work. However, recent observations indicate that these variables do not account for very much of the observed historical increase in the labour supply of women in Canada.[6]

What econometric models fail to capture is the strength of social change – the influence of the women's movement, for example, in changing societal attitudes to women working outside the home; the desire of women themselves to achieve financial

independence or the status that goes with having paid employment; the increasing likelihood of marriage breakdown and the influence this might have on women's participation in the work force. Because these influences are almost impossible to quantify, they tend to be overlooked in the literature, yet their impact on women's labour supply may be considerable. Failure to take these influences into account is, undoubtedly, the major reason why many forecasts of women's participation in the paid work force have been so far off the mark. It may also be why so many policy-makers appear to be unaware of the extent of the changes that have already taken place in women's economic role and in family life.

Effective policy-making must first acknowledge the extent of the changes that have already taken place, and then examine the implications of those changes for the future. That is what this paper attempts to do.

The next section will look at general trends in women's labour force participation; the following section will outline some challenges to traditional views and explanations for women's labour supply; the paper will then discuss some implications for government policy and economic development; and a final section will draw some conclusions from the analysis and suggest areas for further research.

2. Influences on Women's Labour Force Participation

Over the past two decades, the percentage of adult men who participate in the work force has been steadily declining. Improved pension coverage has enabled those in the upper age brackets to retire from paid employment, while those in the youngest age groups continue their education and thus delay their entry to the work force. In the same period of time, however, the labour force participation of women has been rising rapidly. In the past 10 years alone, women's labour force participation rose from 42 per cent to over 52 per cent (Table 1).

The most dramatic change has been in the participation rate of married women, which has increased by 31 per cent since 1976 (Table 2). The labour force participation of widowed and divorced women rose by 12 per cent during that time, while single women increased their labour force participation by 12 per cent (Table 2).

The decade of the seventies marked the demise of the one-earner couple – the kind of family that many people still refer to as "the traditional family". In the 1961 census of population, such families represented 65 per cent of all Canadian families. By 1971, they were 32 per cent of families and by 1981, they accounted for only 16 per cent of all families in Canada. The typical family is now one in which both spouses are in the work force, usually in full-time jobs (Table 3).

An increasing number of families are single-parent families, most of them headed by women. Such families accounted for 11 per cent of all families in the 1981 census – almost as much as the so-called traditional family, where father is the breadwinner and mother stays home with the children (Table 3).

There are many and complex reasons for the rapid rise in women's labour force participation. Among the more obvious reasons are the availability of suitable paid work, the decline in fertility and rising levels of education.

Increased job opportunities

In spite of the fact that there are now many more women working outside their homes than there were 10 or 15 years ago, the role of women in the work force has changed very little. The kinds of jobs women do for pay are very similar to the kinds of work they are expected to do without pay in the home. Their work in both places may include "scrubbing floors, serving food, answering the telephone, teaching children, caring for the sick, cooking meals, sewing clothes, washing hair and, more generally, waiting on people."[7] Even when women work for pay, the work they do is often thought of as "women's work".

Women in the paid labour force are still confined to a limited number of job ghettos – that is, occupations where almost all the workers are women. In 1986, 74 per cent of all women who were working for pay were found in only five broad occupational groups: 31 per cent were in clerical occupations, 18 per cent were in service jobs, 10 per cent were in sales, 9 per cent were in medicine and health (mostly nursing), and 6 per cent were in teaching (Table 10). Ten years earlier, in 1976, 79 per cent of women in paid employment were in these five occupational groups (Table 10).

Women have faced such occupational segregation ever since they first went to work outside their homes. All that has changed is the occupations into which they are segregated. In 1901, for instance, 60 per cent of women in the paid work force were found in only three occupations: 34 per cent were servants, 14 per cent were dressmakers and seamstresses and 13 per cent were teachers.[8]

As Canada moves to a post-industrial economy, the majority of workers, whether male or female, are employed in the service sector of the economy. But the kind of work most women do is overwhelmingly concentrated in this sector. Almost 84 per cent of women who were in paid employment in 1986 (compared with 61 per cent of men) had jobs in the service sector (Table 5). In fact, the majority of women with paying jobs in 1986 were employed in only two areas within that sector: 18 per cent of women (compared with 18 per cent of men) had jobs in trade; and 47 per cent of women (compared with 22 per cent of men) were employed in community, business and personal service (Table 5).

Twenty-two per cent of all the men who had paying jobs in 1986 were employed in manufacturing, whereas less than 12 per cent of employed women worked in this sector. Only 6 per cent of all women (compared with 7 per cent of men) were employed in public administration. Very few women are employed in construction – only 1 per cent of all the women who were in paid employment in 1986 – more than 8 per cent of male workers were employed in this sector (Table 5).

Over the past decade, virtually all employment growth has been concentrated in the service sector. Almost 93 per cent of jobs created since 1976 have been in services, and more than 56 per cent of all new employment has been in community, business and

personal service (Table 6). Expansion of service sector employment may be attributed to both secular and cyclical trends. Long-term decline in traditional smoke-stack industries and expansion of services has been seen as part of the evolution towards a post-industrial, information economy. The economic recession of 1981-1983 may have accelerated the trend, reducing job opportunities in construction and limiting employment growth in primary industries and manufacturing.

In any event, the sectors of greatest employment growth over the decade were also the ones where the majority of women have found employment. It is difficult to establish whether these sectors experienced such rapid growth because women were available to work in them, or whether employment growth was part of the normal sequence of events and was responsible for attracting women into the work force. It is interesting to note, however, that while employment growth in the trade sector and in community, business and personal service accounted for 72 per cent of increased employment for women, it accounted for 86 per cent of new jobs created for men (Table 6). Part of this growth, no doubt, reflects the fact that male workers found employment opportunities were limited in their more usual occupations in primary industries and in manufacturing and construction.

Employment data include both full-time and part-time jobs, but it is part-time work that has expanded most rapidly over the past decade. Some employers responded to the recession by increased use of part-time and temporary employment, as well as contracting out work. Full-time jobs were often converted to part-time jobs. More importantly, many of the employers in the two sectors of greatest employment growth (trade and community, business and personal service) are making increasing use of part-time workers. These sectors include such operations as restaurants, department stores, grocery chains, dry cleaners and other kinds of small businesses where many women work.

Thirty-seven per cent of women who worked in trade in 1986 were employed part-time and 30 per cent of women who had jobs in community, business and personal service had part-time jobs. In fact, 80 per cent of all the women who had part-time jobs in 1986 worked in these two sectors of the economy.[9]

Although women account for 71 per cent of all part-time workers, only 26 per cent of employed women worked part-time in 1986. However, that percentage was up from 21 per cent in 1976 (Table 9). From 1976 to 1986, part-time employment for women increased by 74 per cent, while full-time jobs were up by only 33 per cent (Table 9). Again, it is not clear whether the rapid expansion of part-time work was made possible because women were available and willing to accept part-time employment, but there are indications that an increasing percentage of both women and men would have preferred full-time employment if they could have found it (Table 16).[10]

Declining fertility

It seems clear that declining fertility rates have had some role in the increased labour force participation of women over the past two decades. In 1965, the total fertility rate (that is, the average number of children per woman) was 3.11. By 1985, the rate had

fallen to 1.67 (Table 11). Over the same period of time, the labour force participation of married women of childbearing age (assumed to be ages 20-44) increased from 29.3 per cent in 1966 to 70.4 per cent in 1986 (Table 11).

It also seems clear that the connection between fertility rates and labour force participation is not as simple and direct as many may have assumed. We will return to this point in the next section of this paper.

The natural growth of the labour force

Normal increases in the working-age population may be one reason for the expansion of the labour force, but such increases do not account for the rapid growth in the female work force. Between 1976 and 1986, the female labour force increased by an average 4.4 per cent a year, while the male labour force increase averaged only 1.5 per cent a year (Table 7). Increases in working-age population averaged about the same for both – 1.7 per cent a year for men and 1.8 per cent a year for women – but, while male labour force participation rates declined by an average 0.1 per cent a year, female participation rates grew by an average 2.2 per cent a year (Table 7). As a result, women now account for 43 per cent of the work force, compared with 38 per cent in 1976 (Table 8).

3. A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom

Understanding the possible reasons for women's increased labour force participation is important to government policy-making and to the future course of economic development. Concern about declining fertility, for example, could lead governments to develop policies to encourage women to have more children. However, if such policies are successful, and if women's labour force participation is closely correlated with the total fertility rate, then labour force participation could be reduced, thus affecting future economic development. Reduced participation of women in the work force, for example, could result in a reduction of family incomes; a slowing or even a decline in consumer demand; and labour shortages in certain sectors. As well, those who were excluded from the labour force might experience a downgrading or loss of acquired skills, representing a loss to the economy of human resource potential.

If women have been encouraged to enter the work force in ever-increasing numbers because of the expansion of the service sector or the availability of part-time jobs, then continued expansion of services or further increases in the availability of part-time employment may mean even higher rates of labour force participation – something that would also imply government policy initiatives in order to accommodate even greater numbers of women workers.

Changes in family life must also be taken into account. The predominance of two-earner couples has important implications for the delivery of income security programs, for example, but is it reasonable to assume that the changes are permanent?

The conventional wisdom has not always been helpful in answering these questions. All too often, conclusions seem to be based more on myths and misconceptions

than on careful analysis that takes into account all the possible explanations for change. In this section, we will review some of the issues raised by the conventional wisdom.

How much does fertility explain?

It has generally been assumed that there is a fairly direct link between fertility rates and women's labour force participation. When women have more children, they are less likely to participate in the work force. On the face of it, Canadian data appear to support this conclusion. In the early 1960s, when fertility rates were close to four births per woman, very few women worked outside their homes, at least while their children were of pre-school age. In the mid-1980s, when fertility had dropped to below 1.7, more than 70 per cent of married women of childbearing age are in the work force (Table 11).

There are strong indications, however, that the link is not nearly as direct and straightforward as might have been assumed. In other countries, where women have very much higher rates of labour force participation, fertility rates are also higher than they are in Canada. In Czechoslovakia, for example, 82 per cent of adult women were in the work force in 1980, while total fertility was 2.10. In Poland in the same year, over 79 per cent of adult women were labour force participants and fertility was 2.30. In Cuba, where the total fertility rate was a very low 1.60, only 28 per cent of women participated in the work force. At the same time, in Canada, while fertility was 1.75, only 58 per cent of adult women were labour force participants (Table 15).

The obvious explanation for these differences is that attitudes to women having paid employment vary from one type of society to another. In some societies, women are encouraged or even expected to be in the paid work force. In others, they are expected to remain in the home. Changing attitudes to women in paid employment may also explain the changing labour force participation of Canadian women.

In a landmark study of participation rates and labour force growth in Canada, published in 1980, Dan Ciuriak and Harvey Sims, then of the Department of Finance, concluded that "the traditional relationship between childbearing and the participation rates of women in the prime childbearing age groups has changed very dramatically".[11] Until quite recently, women's labour force participation, when plotted on a graph, followed a familiar "M-shaped" pattern. Participation rates would rise until ages 20-24, then dropped sharply through ages 25-29 and 30-34, as women left the work force to bear and raise children. Participation rates then reached a second (but generally lower) peak between the ages of 40 and 55, as women returned to the work force once their children were in school.

Ciuriak and Sims, basing their work on an internal working paper of Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, published in 1978,[12] noted that the cohort of women who were born between 1931 and 1940 did, indeed, follow this pattern, but women who were born between 1941 and 1950 registered participation rates that rose sharply between ages 14-24 and 25-34. This is a significant departure from the traditional female participation rate pattern and parallels the traditional pattern of male participation rates that tend to rise strongly across these age groups.

The cohort data available for Canada (which unfortunately are for 10-year age groups) thus indicate that a major shift in the age pattern of participation rates is taking place as women move through the childbearing years (Table 14). Five-year age cohort data for the United States indicate that the "M" participation rate pattern was reversed from about the mid-1970s onwards (Table 13). The pattern has also been reversed in a number of other countries.[13]

Eighty per cent or more of all children born in North America are born to women aged 20-34.[14] A comparison of the labour force participation rate of this age group with the fertility rate shows the broad outlines of the relationship between fertility and female labour force participation (the charts on the next two pages show that comparison). Ciuriak and Sims comment as follows:

> Three periods are of interest. In both Canada and the U.S., fertility rates increased through most of the 1950s; during the same period, only very modest increases in the participation rates of women aged 20-34 in both countries were recorded. As fertility rates began dropping in the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the participation rates of women aged 20-34 began to rise more strongly. This relationship between falling fertility rates and rising participation rates was maintained through the early 1970s. In the mid-1970s, however, the rate of decline in fertility slowed down markedly, and fertility rates levelled out in each country. The participation rates of the main childbearing group did not, however, show any tendency to slow their rates of increase. In Canada, the absolute increase in the participation rate of this age group of women from 1973 to 1978 was as large as it had been in any five-year period since the fertility rate peaked in 1959.[15]

Between 1976 and 1986, the labour force participation rate of married women in the age group 20-44 has increased by an annual average rate of 3.8 per cent[16] (Ciuriak and Sims noted that participation rates of women aged 20-34 increased by an average 3.3 per cent a year between 1959 and 1973, when fertility rates were dropping sharply).

All in all, the recent data support the conclusion reached by Ciuriak and Sims in 1980:

> The inhibiting effect of children upon women's labour force participation has tended to become diminished in recent years. Since there are no obvious reasons why this trend should not continue, it appears as though it would be invalid to project a flattening out of the labour force participation rate of women in the childbearing age groups, solely because the fertility rate is not expected to decline significantly in the future.[17]

Why do women work part-time?

As we have already noted, the past decade has seen a major expansion of part-time employment. Many observers apparently believe this is also a major reason for the increased labour force participation of women. They see part-time work as ideally suited to women's needs, since it should allow women to combine paid employment with family responsibilities.

Chart 1

The Total Fertility Rate, and the Participation Rate of Women Aged 20-30, Canada, 1953-1978



(1) The participation rate series breaks in 1975, the year in which major revisions were made to the labour force survey.
(2) The 1978 value shown here for the fertility rate is a forecast estimate.

Source: Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics, Volume 1*, Cat. 84-204, and *The Labour Force*, Cat. 71-001.

(Reproduced from Dan Ciuriak and Harvey Sims, *Participation Rate and Labour Force Growth in Canada*, Department of Finance, April 1980, p. 12)

Chart 2

The Total Fertility Rate, and the Participation Rate of Women Aged 20-34, United States, 1953-1978



(1) No estimate of the 1978 U.S. fertility rate is yet available.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Handbook of Labor Statistics*, and *Employment and Earnings*.

(Reproduced from Dan Ciuriak and Harvey Sims, *Participation Rate and Labour Force Growth in Canada*, Department of Finance, April 1980, p. 13.)

While, undoubtedly, it is true that some women seek only part-time work while their children are young, it is also true that for many women working part-time while their children are small is not an option. They need full-time employment and the full-time salaries that go with it. There is evidence that increasing numbers of part-time workers have had to accept part-time employment, even though they would have preferred a full-time job, because that was all they could find.

The reasons why women work part-time (rather than full-time) have changed over the past decade. In 1976, 26 per cent of married women said they worked part-time because they had family or personal responsibilities. In 1986, only 19 per cent gave this as their reason for part-time employment. Significantly, only 10 per cent of married women with part-time jobs in 1976 said they could only find part-time work; while 25 per cent would have preferred full-time work in 1986 (Table 16). Thirty-one per cent of all men who worked part-time in 1986 said they could only find part-time work – up from 13 per cent in 1976.[18]

The increase in involuntary part-time work among women workers also reflects increasing use of part-time employees in those sectors of the economy where most women find employment. The concentration of women in certain sectors (referred to earlier) may mean that those who seek paid employment may have no alternative other than part-time work. A recent study of involuntary part-time employment[19] notes that of the 2,027,000 increase in employment during the period 1976-1986, 408,000 (or 20.1 per cent) was accounted for by involuntary part-time employment. Slightly more than one-half (53.0 per cent) of the total increase in part-time employment during this period was involuntary. The phenomenon was much more marked in the five-year period from 1981-1986, when the increase in involuntary part-time employment represented 81.2 per cent of total employment growth (92.0 per cent of part-time employment growth) during the same period.[20]

Availability of child care and women's labour force participation

As we have already noted, the presence of pre-school children no longer seems to have a major inhibiting effect on women's labour force participation. The past decade has brought remarkable changes in labour force activity of mothers with very young children. In 1976, less than 32 per cent of mothers with children under the age of 3 worked outside their homes and only 41 per cent of mothers whose youngest child was aged 3-5 were labour force participants. By 1986, 56 per cent of mothers with children under 3 were in the work force and 60 per cent of mothers whose youngest child was between 3 and 5 were in the work force (Table 17).

Participation rates vary somewhat, according to whether the husband is employed or unemployed, or whether the mother is a single parent. Single-parent mothers with small children tend to have slightly lower participation rates than mothers in two-parent families where the husband is employed.

Although some studies have suggested that lack of adequate child care has prevented some women who would like to enter the work force from doing so, there is evidence that women have entered the work force, even though adequate, quality child

care services are not available. The number of licenced child care spaces in both day care centres and family day care homes has continued to increase as women's labour force participation has increased, but there are still not nearly enough licenced spaces to meet the demand.

In 1986, there were only 221,000 licenced spaces in Canada, but in the same year, 535,000 mothers with pre-school children and full-time jobs were in the paid labour force (Table 18). Clearly, the majority of families had to leave their children with unlicenced caregivers, and the quality of care received by these children may often have been inferior.[21]

The federal Task Force on Child Care that reported in 1986 estimated that less than 9 per cent of child care services in 1984 had access to quality, licenced care (Table 19). While these children are denied the services they need, some economists continue to debate the question of whether publicly-funded child care services would tempt into the work force women for whom it would be "more efficient" to stay at home.[22] There seems to be a concern in some quarters that any improvement in the quality or accessibility of child care services would lead to even greater increases in women's labour force participation. The argument is not a new one. But the Royal Commission on the Status of Women dealt with it more than 15 years ago in its 1970 report, when it said:

> The time is past when society can refuse to provide community child services in the hope of dissuading mothers from leaving their children and going to work.[23]

Women's contribution to family income

Economic reasons are undoubtedly a major influence on women's labour force participation. More and more women are now the sole support of their families, but for families with young children, two incomes are often needed to support the family – especially if the family has any hope of buying a home. The mythology persists among some observers that women could "choose" to stay home if only they were willing to make some financial sacrifices, and that many women who are in the work force are only working to buy non-essential luxuries. The data indicate otherwise.

In families with children under the age of 6, where the wife did not work outside the home, the median husband's income in 1974 was only $27,000 and average total income for these families was $29,000. But families with children under 6 where both the wife and husband were in the labour force had an average income of close to $41,000 (Table 20). The cost of child care, of course, would have to be taken into account in comparing the financial situation of the two types of families, but it is evident that average incomes of two-earner couples with young children are significantly higher than those of one-earner couples with pre-schoolers.

Census data from 1971 showed that in families where both the husband and wife were in paid employment, the wife's contribution to family income rose from 27 per cent in 1971 to 30 per cent in 1981, while that of husbands dropped from 68 per cent to 65 per cent

in the same period of time.[24] The contribution of wives to family income would have been even greater had it not been for the continuing wage gap between women and men.

The importance of two incomes in providing adequate financial support for families is underlined by the widening gap between two-parent families and single-parent families, especially those headed by women (as most are). During the 1970s, the average income of single-parent families headed by women increased by only 18 per cent, while that of husband-and-wife families rose by 31 per cent. The difference is even more significant if one takes into account the fact that the number of children in two-parent families has been declining, while the number of children in single-parent families has increased.[25]

Since the beginning of the 1980s, the incidence of poverty among single-parent families headed by women has increased alarmingly. In 1984, 60 per cent of single-parent families headed by women who were under the age of 65 were poor, compared with 55 per cent in 1979.[26]

The generation gap

As we have already seen, there are now significant differences in the work patterns of women of different generations. The earlier generation of women – those now in the age group 45-54 – generally followed what has been thought of as the "traditional" pattern. Their paid employment was interrupted, often for long periods of time, for childbearing and childrearing. Two main influences were at work: the fertility rate for these women, when they were in their childbearing years, was much higher than it is for women of childbearing age today; and, secondly, societal expectations were different. Twenty years ago, women with young children were expected to remain at home as full-time homemakers.

The majority of married women in the age group 45-64 still remain at home as full-time homemakers, although the labour force participation rate of this age group has increased over the past decade from 37.2 per cent in 1976 to 45.9 per cent in 1986 (Table 21).

Women in this age group have higher rates of part-time work than women in other age cohorts, with the exception of married women in the age group 15-19, who accounted for less than 1 per cent of all married women in 1986 (Table 22).

It is of interest to note that married women in the 45-64 year age group in the past have probably been thought of as a major source of voluntary workers. Women who have remained at home as full-time homemakers have often been able to become involved in voluntary work once their children were in school. The dwindling number of women in this age group who are not in paid employment is likely to have an impact on the voluntary sector in years to come. Over the past decade, the population of women aged 45-64 has increased by 11 per cent. But the percentage of women in this age group who are not in the work force has dropped by 1 per cent, and the number of married women aged 45-64 who are not in paid employment dropped by nearly 7 per cent between 1976 and 1986 (Table 23).

The younger generation of married women appear to be following quite a different path from that taken by their mothers. Over the past 10 years, the labour force participation of married women in the 20-44 year age group increased by more than 38 per cent – from 50.9 per cent in 1976 to 70.4 per cent in 1986 (Table 11). Societal attitudes to women working outside the home have clearly changed over the past 10 to 15 years, but it is still not entirely clear if women in this generation have fewer children because they want to (or must) work outside the home, or if they are free to work outside the home because they have decided to have fewer children. No doubt both influences are at work.

Women's changing aspirations

As more and more women have gone to work outside their homes, women who continue to fulfill the traditional role of wife and mother may have felt that the occupation of "homemaker" has declined in status. Recent efforts have been directed towards upgrading the status of homemaker by, for example, trying to design special pensions for homemakers, and through the formation of organizations focused on women who remain outside the paid labour force. For these groups, "choosing" to stay at home is to be preferred to accepting paid employment, but they usually overlook the fact that, for economic reasons, most women are not free to make that choice.

While it is undoubtedly true that many more families would be below the poverty line if wives did not work outside the home,[27] women are also joining the work force to satisfy personal goals, in the same way that men do. As Ciuriak and Sims pointed out in their 1980 study:

> Women's personal aspirations have changed dramatically since the early 1950s: women are more career-oriented and much less willing than previously to simply manage homes and raise children. In this regard, the growth of women's movements both reflects this attitudinal change, and is a measure of the fact that many women feel much more change, in the same direction, is required. The changes in aspirations and orientation which have occurred have been reflected in and reinforced by steady increases in the average educational attainment of women. Increased schooling has opened new career possibilities for women, providing them with access to more challenging and satisfying work as well as increasing the wages they can command.[28]

As many studies have noted, the more education women have, the higher their labour force participation rates. In 1986, for example, the participation rate of women with only a high school education was 56 per cent, whereas 78 per cent of women with a university degree were labour force participants (Table 24).

The likelihood of divorce

The possibility of marriage breakdown has probably had a major impact on the labour force participation of women. Again, the relationship is complex and has yet to be fully explored. Women's increased ability to be self-sufficient and financially independent may have meant that women are less likely to have to rely on marriage for economic support and, therefore, are freer to leave an unsatisfactory marriage than they

might have been 15 or 20 years ago. The data on poverty of female-headed, single-parent families, however, do not seem to support this hypothesis.

Some observers have argued that women are aware of the increased possibility of marriage breakdown and thus are likely to maintain their labour force participation throughout a marriage in the expectation they will not stay married forever.[29]

In a background paper prepared for the Macdonald Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Alice Nakamura and Masao Nakamura argue that "working wives" may be categorized into those who see themselves as working on a short-term basis to meet the economic needs of their families; those who see themselves as working on a long-term (or career) basis to meet the economic needs of their families; and those whose work activities are not primarily motivated by family money matters.

These authors suggest that in their late teens and early twenties most young women deliberately take courses of action (or make a series of inadvertent choices) that, together with circumstance, lead towards a lifestyle either as primarily a wife and homemaker or where work outside the home plays an important role. Those who head toward lifestyles as full-time wives and homemakers, say Nakamura and Nakamura, will tend to have more children, primarily by preference, and invest less in occupation-oriented education and training than their work-oriented counterparts. Some of them may also end up working part, or even most, of their adult lives because of the economic troubles of their families or because they fail to marry, or lose their husbands through divorce or death. Some of those who begin working out of necessity may come to like their jobs and become career-oriented. Some home-oriented women may take jobs which might be viewed in some senses as extensions of hobby or volunteer activities. At the same time, many of those who head toward lifetimes on the job will marry and have families. Thus, these authors expect to see shifts of working wives among these categories over time.

If there is any truth to this speculative picture, say Nakamura and Nakamura, then the reported findings on interrelationships of child status, husband's income and education variables, and the employment and earnings behaviour of women are what we might expect to find. But, these authors maintain:

> The scenario also suggests, however, that if we wish to understand what has caused the dramatic upswing in recent years in the labour supply of married women we must look for other factors which could have caused a major shift in a) the proportions of would-be full-time homemakers who must go to work on a short-term or long-term basis to meet family needs, or b) the proportions of very young women choosing lifestyles as full-time, or would-be full-time, wives and homemakers versus those heading toward lifetimes on the job.[30]

Demographers have noted that marriage appears to be undergoing transformations that are likely to exert a depressing influence on fertility.[31] Nakamura and Nakamura argue that these changes are also influencing women's labour force participation, although the exact relationship has yet to be established.

There has been a major escalation in both divorce and remarriage over the past 20 years, although for the past few years the divorce rate has been declining. Data on divorce prior to the passage of the Divorce Act in 1968 are not strictly comparable with divorce statistics since that time. However, it has been estimated that during the period 1960-1962, the average divorce rate stood at 169 per 100,000 married women over the age of 15.[32] By 1985, the figure had jumped to 1,004, or almost six times as much (Table 25). Over roughly the same period, the ratio of divorces to marriages climbed from 5 per cent to 36 per cent.[33] The divorce rate, expressed in relation to 100,000 married women aged 15-plus peaked in 1982 at 1,164, and has declined somewhat since then (Table 25). The rate of remarriage has apparently also slowed down. In 1970, 48 per cent of the divorces involving women aged 20-24 were "recovered" by the remarriage of divorced women in the same age group, but by 1980 this proportion had gone down to 36 per cent, and less than half of the women divorcing at ages under 35 eventually remarried.[34] Remarriage appears to be as fragile, if not more so, than first marriage, according to some observers, and American studies have shown a somewhat higher divorce rate for remarriages than for first marriages.[35]

Since the median age of women at divorce in 1984 was 33.8,[36] it would appear that many of the women who are divorced will not eventually remarry, although it remains to be established just how this possibility might affect women's decisions about labour force activity.

As divorce rates have climbed, so has the labour force participation of married women (Tables 25 and 26). Between 1970 and 1985, for example, the divorce rate per 100,000 married women increased by 62 per cent, while the labour force participation rate of married women in the age group 20-44 rose by 94 per cent (Table 25).

4. Implications for Policy and Economic Development

It is evident that the nature of women's labour force participation has changed dramatically over the past 10 years or so. The part played by declining fertility is neither as straightforward nor as direct as may have been supposed, but it is also apparent that changes in women's work patterns and in family structure are unlikely to be reversed.

Government policies and business attitudes have often been slow to recognize and accept the dramatic changes that have already taken place, and that may impede effective policy development for the future. Many government policies, for example, are still based on the so-called "traditional family" as the norm, with husband as breadwinner and wife at home as full-time homemaker, and with two or more children. Such families now account for only 16 per cent of all families in Canada (Table 3), yet policy-makers still cite them as "typical".[37]

Policy-makers who design employment, training and other labour market policies and programs often focus on particular demographic groups within the work force. The analysis of labour market economists still largely excludes women, treating them as exceptions to the norm – generally considered to be male workers between the ages of 25 and 54 (the prime-age males). The fact that this approach still predominates in the

economics profession has undoubtedly influenced some of the policy prescriptions now being put forward. It is interesting to note that men between the ages of 25 and 54 (the prime-age males) accounted for less than 39 per cent of the work force in 1986, down from 40 per cent in 1976. There were more women in the work force than there were prime-age males. The percentage of workers who could be classed as "older workers" (that is aged 55 or older), to whom special programs might be addressed, has declined from 12 per cent in 1976 to just over 10 per cent in 1986, and the percentage of young workers (aged 15 to 24) decreased from 27 per cent in 1976 to 22 per cent in 1986 (Table 8).

Some of the studies cited in the background papers on which the Macdonald Royal Commission based its recommendations for labour markets and income security programs were based on male workers only. The consequences of policy development based on an analysis that excludes women are evident in the solutions proposed by the Macdonald Commission.

The Commission proposed a 40 per cent cut in unemployment insurance benefits, for example, suggesting that the money saved be redirected to an adjustment assistance program to help workers make the transition to new types of employment; however, to be eligible for assistance, workers would have to be prime age or older with at least five years' attachment to the labour force. If that is interpreted to be the five years immediately prior to entry into the adjustment assistance program, women who recently re-entered the work force after a brief period at home with children might not be able to qualify, even though they may have been in the work force for a much longer period in total.

The Macdonald Commission also put considerable emphasis on incentives to encourage workers to move to another part of the country in search of jobs. Such a strategy might be appropriate as an approach to the unemployment problems of prime-age males whose wives are not in the work force, but the vast majority of workers no longer fit that pattern. In most husband-and-wife families now, both spouses are in the work force. Because men earn so much more than women do, most families must locate wherever the husband can find work, but if it is the wife who is unemployed, moving to another part of the country to find work for her is not likely to be a viable option for the family.

Innovative and effective policy-making in such circumstances would start from the premise that both spouses need employment and would search for solutions that meet the needs of women as well as men. Instead, background papers prepared for the Commission indicate a totally different approach, aimed at turning back the clock and returning women to a more traditional role. One paper, on which many of the Commission's income security proposals were based, suggests rationing jobs to one per family. Only one person in a household would be certified as "employable" and therefore eligible for government training and adjustment programs, according to proposals put forward by the author of this paper. In the majority of cases, he says, "secondary workers in families with another full-time worker would not qualify," unless family income fell below a certain threshold.[38]

Such an approach, instead of attempting to adapt to and accommodate the changes that have already taken place, seeks to reverse them.

For policy-makers who prefer a more forward-looking and constructive approach to policy development, there are a number of key issues. Those listed below start from the premise that women are in the work force to stay, and take into account the likely influences on their labour force activity that have been discussed in this paper.

- While the rate of decline in fertility rates has slowed down quite markedly, there has been little sign of a similar slowdown in the rate of increase in the labour force participation of married women in childbearing age groups. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that women's labour force participation would be unlikely to be affected significantly if fertility began to increase again.

- In other countries, government efforts to increase fertility through such initiatives as better paid maternity leave or child care arrangements have been generally unsuccessful. In Canada, women have entered the work force despite the lack of quality, licenced child care and fully-paid maternity leave. However, it may well be that fertility decisions have been governed by these considerations. If women are in the work force primarily for economic reasons, as seems to be the case, it may be difficult (particularly for those at the lower end of the income scale) for families to afford to have a second child.

Maternity benefits available under the unemployment insurance program provide replacement income, spread over a 17-week leave period, equivalent to only 53 per cent of a woman worker's usual earnings. For lower-income families, this drop in income, while the mother is on maternity leave, represents a serious financial penalty for childbearing.[39] Canada's maternity benefits program compares unfavourably with most other industrialized countries in the world in terms of both length of leave and level of benefits. Improvements in this program might make it easier for some families to make the decision to have a second child. At the very least, such improvements would signal society's desire to support rather than to penalize childbearing.

Again, policy development in this area must be based on the assumption that most women who will bear children will be in the work force and will want to take a relatively short leave before returning to paid employment. Data on the labour force participation of women of childbearing age and of mothers of very young children (Tables 17 and 25) are evidence of this.

Similar considerations apply to the provision of quality, accessible child care services, preferably through publicly-funded facilities. Hundreds of thousands of children are currently denied access to such services. Given that the majority of young children in two-parent families are in families where both parents are in the work force, the lack of child care services can only be regarded as a major crisis on which public policy action is urgently required. It seems short-sighted to argue that provision of child care would only tempt more women into the work force – the point is they are already there.

- Policy-makers have made statements recently about support for "the voluntary sector". It has been customary to speak of volunteer and unpaid work in the household as alternate forms of work. For most women, these unpaid activities are no longer an alternate way of occupying their time, but activities they undertake (if they undertake them at all) in addition to their paid employment.

Government restraint policies at both federal and provincial levels have resulted in cutbacks of social services and the expectation that services previously provided by various levels of government will now be supplied by volunteers. Many of these "voluntary" tasks have traditionally fallen to women. Women are now expected to staff food banks that have become increasingly important to the survival of the poor in some regions; to volunteer to support the activities of teachers in schools; to operate many important services within hospitals; and to raise money to fund educational and other projects.

Yet many of the women who might have had time to engage in these unpaid activities in the past are now involved in paying jobs in the labour force. Strategies that place increasing reliance on the provision of needed social services through the voluntary sector will have to confront this fact. In the area of day care, for example, policy-makers have been known to suggest that rather than provide publicly-funded, licenced care in day care centres or in regulated and supervised homes, parents should be able to make their own arrangements with women in the neighbourhood who will act as babysitters for a few children in their own homes, but even the Royal Commission, in its 1970 report, noted that:

> It would be inadvisable, however, to rely too heavily on care in a private home. It is becoming more difficult to find suitable homes, as women turn in greater numbers to outside work, and there is a high rate of interruptions as families move away or for other reasons must discontinue giving care.[40]

Those observations apply equally to the availability of women who do not work outside of the home to provide volunteer services to their communities.

- Income security programs and the income tax system, which are now in the process of review, must be based on the new reality of Canadian families. The possibility of family-income-based benefits raises other important issues for women's economic independence that are beyond the scope of this paper. Yet the issue is complex and will need very careful consideration before solutions can be advanced that will reconcile possibly conflicting objectives.

- Labour market policies and employment, training and other strategies must take into account women's differing work experiences. Policies based on an economic analysis that excludes women are unlikely to be effective in addressing women's needs. Nor will they likely be effective in promoting Canada's economic development. Women now account for 43 per cent of the work force and development strategies based on the other 57 per cent of workers are unlikely to be successful.

A recent study of dual labour market theories indicated that women are mainly to be found in the secondary labour market where jobs tend to be lower-paid, short-term or temporary, with few employee benefits and little opportunity for promotion. The analysis also indicates that training does not always make it possible for women in the secondary market to move into more stable and better-paying jobs in the primary labour market.[41]

Occupational segregation of women in the work force is the main reason for the continuing wage gap between women and men, but women have not been able to make much progress in moving out of their low-paying job ghettos into the higher-paying jobs, usually occupied by men. Their opportunities to do so may be particularly limited in a time of shrinking job markets, when economic conditions combined with technological change have curtailed or even reduced the number of jobs that are non-traditional for women.

Desegregation of the work force will not be easily achieved. Those who counsel women to move into non-traditional occupations often overlook the fact that if occupational segregation is to be eliminated, men must also be willing to undertake what has up to now been regarded as "women's work". It has been estimated that to achieve desegregation of the United States work force, more than ten million women would have to trade places with ten million men.[42] Similar calculations for Canada indicate that if job ghettos are to be eliminated here, about 2.5 million women would have to change jobs with 2.5 million men. Close to 700,000 men would have to become secretaries, and another 200,000 would have to become nurses, while nearly 370,000 women would have to move into manufacturing and another 250,000 into construction.[43] Such solutions are clearly impractical.

- Given that most families will consist of two working parents with one and perhaps two children, employers will have to look at changing work time arrangements. Pressure from both women and men to make parenting a shared responsibility will mean that parents who want to spend more time with their children will increasingly challenge the way work has been defined. Flexible working time, shorter working hours and other worktime initiatives will have to be examined.

Industrialized society has defined paid employment in terms that fit with the notion of the "traditional family," where father is the breadwinner and mother remains at home to look after the children and do the housework. To have a "job" is to be expected to work eight hours a day, five days a week, 48-50 weeks in the year. A worker must expect to work overtime if the employer requests it, perhaps to be available to work on weekends, and to be ready to pull up stakes and move to another part of the country if asked to do so.

Such terms and conditions no longer fit the pattern of the typical Canadian family. Trade unions and others are already pressing for changes in worktime arrangements and for shorter working hours, but often these initiatives have been seen as a way of sharing available paid work rather than adapting work arrangements to the changed family profile.

The expansion of part-time work, which has been a feature of most industrialized economies since the 1979-1981 recession, has been welcomed in many quarters as helping women accommodate their desire for paid employment to their family responsibilities, yet more and more women are working part-time, even though they would prefer full-time work.

If we redefined paid work to mean shorter working hours for everyone, we would eventually be able to eliminate what one observer has called the "haves" and "have-nots" of the job market. Shorter working hours with no loss of pay should be possible, expecially if the application of new technology allows for productivity improvement, as many observers believe it will.

Suggestions such as early retirement and longer vacations, while they reduce the number of hours worked in a year, do not get away from the definition of "work" that we have now. While a worker might get six weeks' vacation a year, she or he would still be expected to work 40 hours a week for the rest of the time (or perhaps 15 hours if the job is part-time).

Job-sharing, another strategy recommended by some, especially as a way for parents to combine paid employment with family responsibilities, does not really accommodate the new reality either. While some workers (notably those with young children) would be expected to split a job and split a salary, others would get full-time hours (as we now define them) and full-time salary. Again, this option does little to challenge the way paid employment is now defined and it effectively penalizes parents in relation to other workers without young children.

It is important that alternate work schedules take into account the fact that parents in paid employment (which is the majority of parents with young children) need to be able to spend more time with their children on an ongoing basis, so that shared parenting can become a reality.

Programs such as those adopted by Sweden support the new reality of family life. Parents of young children in that country may choose to work a six-hour day, at no loss of pay, and have the right to full-paid leave for such family responsibilities as attendance at the child's school, taking the child to medical appointments, or visiting the child care centre to discuss any problems the child may be having there.

- In the longer-term, technological change may have major impacts on women's work, both in the home and in the workplace -- impacts that have yet to be fully explored. The idea of an electronic cottage, described by Alvin Toffler in his book, "The Third Wave", is one that may eventually come to Canada. Some employers already view the possibility of women working at home on their own computer terminals as an ideal solution for mothers unable to find quality child care for their children. The prospect may well be an alarming one for women, who could be expected to undertake routine clerical work at home and look after their children at the same time in a kind of high-tech version of the sweatshop cottage industry common before the industrial revolution.

Some futurists see the possibility of working at home that technology makes feasible as a positive development for families. In the future, they say, families could form independent work units, working from their homes and offering their services on a *contract basis to employers*. Such a view, perhaps, seems overly optimistic. Electronic homeworking, in fact, means shifting the burden of overhead costs, such as providing the work space, heating, lighting, insurance and other expenses, from the employer to the individual worker. And independent contractors usually have to forego employee benefits such as unemployment insurance and pensions (which is why some employers are attracted by the idea).

The danger for women is that their jobs, mostly routine clerical work, can most easily be transferred to the home. Such a move would increase the isolation of women and reinforce their traditional role as primarily responsible for home and children. There is no indication what the impact might be on fertility.

In a more hopeful vein, the move to a post-industrial economy could be a positive one for women in some respects. Futurists predict that mass production and large hierarchical organizations will be phased out in favour of small production runs and smaller work units. They suggest that work will be carried out by autonomous work teams rather than on assembly lines. The information society, or post-industrial economy, is collaborative rather than competitive, it has been suggested.

Those concerned with women's employment are only too aware of the problems women face in trying to move up the promotional ladder in Canada's big corporate hierarchies. If work is to be organized in small, co-operative work teams, then the integration of previously disadvantaged workers, and particularly women, could be much easier.

These developments are likely to be much farther down the road than some of the other possibilities already discussed in this paper, but they are possibilities that must be taken into account in economic development strategies and government policy-making.

- The role of trade unions in relation to women workers may be particularly important in the years to come. Many policy initiatives that have benefited women, such as shorter working hours and fully-paid parental leave, have been won first by trade unions through the collective bargaining process. As well, occupations and sectors where most women workers are concentrated remain largely unorganized. Retail trade and banking are two areas where unions have worked hard, so far without success, to organize women workers. If these efforts are eventually successful, wages and working conditions of women workers could change significantly. So far, this appears to be largely uncharted territory.

5. Conclusions

If government policies are to be effective and economic development is to proceed for the benefit of all Canadians, it is essential that the extent of the changes that have

already taken place in women's economic role be acknowledged and incorporated into policy development. Outdated myths and misconceptions about women's labour force participation and work patterns have no place in the process. Exclusion of women from the economic analysis on which so much contemporary policy is based is likely to be seriously detrimental to the outcome of policy deliberations.

This paper has attempted to dispel some of the myths and misconceptions and to outline some of the considerations that must be taken into account for the future.

Further research is needed in a number of areas and could be helpful in the development of appropriate policies. Some of those areas are suggested here:

- As we have seen, the number of single-parent families headed by women is increasing, but the rate of poverty among such families has soared to reach 60 per cent (among single-parent families headed by women under age 65).[44] It would be useful to have a more detailed profile of such families. What determines the labour force participation of women who head these families, for example, and why do they appear to have a lower participation rate than women whose husbands are present? Why does family size (number of children) appear to be increasing among female-headed single parent families in relation to two-parent families? What are the implications if the percentage of single-parent families headed by women continues to increase (perhaps at an accelerated rate)?

- What impact does the availability of licenced child care and/or fully paid parental leave have on women's labour force participation and fertility rates? Would women's labour force participation increase (and by how much) if publicly-funded, universally accessible child care services became available? Would the provision of such services have any impact on fertility rates? How does the lack of fully-paid parental leave affect women's fertility decisions? What impact does the lack of paid leave for other family responsibilities have? How does the absence of these support programs for parents in the work force affect productivity, absenteeism and other workforce behaviours?

- Further insights into the relationship between divorce, remarriage and labour force participation would also be useful. Nakamura and Nakamura suggest a need for research on the interrelationships between the work behaviour of women and their propensity to marry and stay married. They also suggest the need for more research devoted to the behaviour of young women. Relatively little attention has been devoted to the work behaviour of either young women or young men, say these authors, or to the formation of their attitudes concerning work.[45]

Nakamura and Nakamura note that the observed sensitivity of the work behaviour of women to changes in marital status highlights the need for more detailed research on those who are not currently married. To date, Nakamura and Nakamura indicate, most studies of female work behaviour have dealt with all women, or have been limited to currently married women. Little is known about differences in behaviour among various

groups of currently unmarried women.[46] It would also be helpful to have more information on the influences and impact on teenage women of educational and temporary work experiences in shaping work and lifestyle choices.

- More thorough examination of the generation gap could also offer insights to policy-makers. It would appear that the younger generation of women is opting for different lifetime work patterns, but the labour force survey and census of population provide only cross-sectional data. There do not appear to be any longitudinal studies that would provide further and more detailed evidence of the changed work patterns of married women. In this connection, further study of the work behaviour of women in the 45-64 year age group would be of interest, as well as studies that would throw some light on activities in the voluntary sector and the changing balance between paid and unpaid work for this age cohort.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of further research that could assist policy development, but it is important to emphasize that an inter-disciplinary approach is likely to be the most fruitful. Social change has played a very important role in the relationship of women's labour force participation, fertility and economic development. Very complex interrelationships are obviously at work here. Interpretation of these relationships and the formulation of appropriate government policies must be based on an analysis that is able to incorporate and acknowledge the strength of the social changes that have taken place and that are still in progress.

Footnotes

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3. A. Leibowitz (1972) Women's Allocation of Time to Market and Nonmarket Activities: Differences by Education, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University; C. Russell Hill and Frank Stafford, "The Allocation of Time to Preschool Children and Educational Opportunity," *Journal of Human Resources*, Summer 1974; Reuban Gronau, "The Effect of Children on the Housewife's Value of Time," in *Economics of the Family: Marriage, Children and Human Capital*, edited by Theodore W. Schultz, pp. 457-88, Chicago University Press, 1974.

4. Alice Nakamura and Masao Nakamura (1985) "A Survey of Research on the Work Behaviour of Canadian Women," in *Work and Pay: The Canadian Labour Market*, W. Craig Riddell, Research Coordinator, Vol. 17 of studies commissioned by the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, University of Toronto Press, p. 178.

5. Economic Council of Canada (1976) *People and Jobs: A Study of the Canadian Labour Market*, Summary and Recommendations, p. 26.

6. *Supra*, note 4, p. 185.

7. Pat Armstrong and Hugh Armstrong (1978) *The Double Ghetto*, McClelland and Stewart, p. 46.

8. *Supra*, note 1, p. 85.

9. Statistics Canada (1986) *The Labour Force*, Calculated from Table 82.

10. See Also "Part-time Employment in Canada, 1975-1985," in Statistics Canada, *The Labour Force*, December 1986, p. 143.

11. Dan Ciuriak and Harvey Sims (1980) *Participation Rate and Labour Force Growth in Canada*, Department of Finance, Long Range and Structural Analysis Division, p. 20.

12. Serge Bertrand (1978) *A Cohort Analysis of Female Labour Force Participation*, Strategy, Policy and Planning Group, Employment and Immigration Canada.

13. Monica Townson (1984) *The Labour Force Participation of Women in the ECE Region*, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, p. 20.

14. *Supra*, note 11, p. 11.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Calculated from Appendix Table 11.

17. *Supra*, note 11, p. 21.

18. Statistics Canada (1985) *The Labour Force*, Table 83.

19. *Supra*, note 10.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

21. See, for example, *Report of the Task Force on Child Care*, Status of Women Canada, March 1986, Chapter 3.

22. See for example Michael Krashinsky, November 1984, *Day Care Policy in Canada in the 1980s*, Presentation to the Colloquium on the Economic Status of Women in the Labour Market, Economic Council of Canada, p. 9.

23. *Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada* (1970) Ottawa, p. 263.

24. Statistics Canada (1984) *Changes in Incomes in Canada 1970-1980.*

25. Census data on families are reviewed in the following publications of Statistics Canada: *Canada's Young Family Home-owners*, February 1984, Catalogue No. 99-939; *Canada's Lone-parent Families*, May 1984, Catalogue No. 99-933; *Changes in Incomes in Canada*, May 1984, Catalogue No. 99-941.

26. Statistics Canada (1984) *Income Distributions by Size in Canada*, Text Table IV.

27. See, for example, The National Council of Welfare, Ottawa 1979, *Women and Poverty*, pp. 20-21.

28. *Supra*, note 11, p. 8.

29. *Supra*, note 4, p. 196.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

31. A. Romaniuc (1984) *Fertility in Canada: From Baby-boom to Baby-bust*, Statistics Canada Demography Division, p. 59.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Supra*, note 29, p. 60

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*

36. Statistics Canada, *Marriages and divorces*, Vital Statistics, Volume II, 1984, Table 1.

37. See for example, Department of Finance, Canada, *Securing Economic Renewal: Budget Papers*, February 26, 1986, p. 41.

38. Jonathan R. Kesselman (1985) "Comprehensive Income Security for Canadian Workers," in *Income Distribution and Economic Security in Canada*, François Vaillancourt, Research Cordinator, Vol.1 in the series of studies commissioned by the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, University of Toronto Press, pp. 283-319.

39. Monica Townson (1985) *Paid Parental Leave Policies: An International Comparison with Options for Canada*, Background Papers for the Report of the Task Force on Child Care, Status of Women Canada.

40. *Supra*, note 21, p. 266.

41. Monica Townson (1986) *The Segmentation of Labour Markets*, report prepared for the Commission of Inquiry on Unemployment Insurance, (forthcoming).

42. Minnesota Commission on the Economic Status of Women (1985) *Pay Equity: The Minnesota Experience*, p. 3.

43. Calculation based on Statistics Canada, *The Labour Force*, December 1985, Table 71, and assumes women would occupy 43% of each occupation since women account for 43% of all workers in the labour force.

44. Statistics Canada (1984) *Income Distributions by Size in Canada*, Text Table IV.

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Table 1

The Labour Force Participation of Women
1967-1986

Participation rates of women and men aged 25 years and over

YEAR	WOMEN	MEN	YEAR	WOMEN	MEN
	%	%		%	%
1967	32.3	84.5	1977	42.1	80.9
1968	32.8	84.0	1978	44.1	81.1
1969	33.8	83.8	1979	45.0	81.0
1970	34.5	83.3	1980	46.4	80.7
1971	35.4	82.7	1981	48.1	80.5
1972	36.2	82.3	1982	48.5	79.5
1973	37.6	82.3	1983	49.6	79.1
1974	38.5	82.2	1984	50.6	78.6
1975	40.0	81.9	1985	51.6	78.6
1976	41.1	81.1	1986	52.4	78.2
Change 1967/76	+27.2%	-4.3%	Change 1977/86	+24.5%	-3.3%

Source: Statistics Canada, *Historical Labour Force Statistics - Actual Data, Seasonal Factors, Seasonally Adjusted Data, 1985*, pp. 251 and 257, *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 56.

Table 2

Labour Force Participation and Marital Status
1976-1986

Women aged
15-64

YEAR	SINGLE	MARRIED	OTHER	TOTAL
1976	58.8	42.8	31.6	45.2
1977	59.0	44.2	32.4	46.0
1978	60.5	46.3	33.6	47.9
1979	61.8	47.5	34.4	49.0
1980	63.3	49.0	35.1	50.4
1981	64.6	50.6	35.6	51.7
1982	63.3	51.2	35.3	51.7
1983	64.0	52.3	36.1	52.6
1984	64.7	53.7	35.3	53.5
1985	65.7	54.7	36.4	54.3
1986	66.1	56.1	35.3	55.1
Increase 1976-86	+12.4%	+31.1%	+11.7%	+21.9%

Source: Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Annual Averages, 1975-1983*, Table 3; *The Labour Force* December 1984, Table 58; *The Labour Force* December 1985, Table 56; *The Labour Force* December 1986, Table 56.

Table 3

Family Types in Canada

	1961	1971	1981
	%	%	%
Husband-and-wife families			
One-earner couples[a]	65	32	16
Two-earner couples[b]	14	36	49
Other families[c]	16	23	24
Single-parent families[d]	6	9	11
Total	100	100	100

Source: Statistics Canada, *Women in Canada; A Statistical Report*, 1971 and 1981, (Ottawa: March 1985) Catalogue No. 89-503E, Table 1, p. 6 and Table 2, p. 69. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Canada, 1961: Households and Families*, (Ottawa: July 1964), Table 93, p. 93-1, and Table 73, p. 73-1. (Table reproduced in chart form in *Report of the Task Force on Child Care*. Status of Women Canada, March 1986, p. 7.)

Notes: Totals may not add to 100% because of rounding.

a. One-earner couples refer to married couples, with or without children, in which only the husband is an income earner.

b. Two-earner couples refer to married couples, with or without children, in which both spouses are income-earners.

c. Other families include husband-wife families in which neither spouse is an income earner and families with more than two income earners.

d. Single parents refer to single adults, either male or female, with at least one child. The adult need not be an "income earner", i.e., includes single parents on government support.

Table 4

Number and Average Size of Husband-Wife Families, Husbands Under 65 years of Age, by Number of Earners, 1970 and 1980

Number of Earners	Number of Families				Average Size	
	1970		1980		1970	1980
	'000	%	'000	%		
None	79	2	155	3	3.69	2.99
One	1,768	43	1,413	29	4.06	3.51
Two	1,731	42	2,565	52	3.54	3.18
Three or more	495	12	774	16	5.18	4.50
Total	4,073	100	4,907	100	3.97	3.48

Source: Statistics Canada, 1971 and 1981 Censuses of Canada, unpublished data. Reproduced as Table 2 in *Changes in Income in Canada: 1970-1980*, May 1984.

Table 5

Employment of Women and Men by Sector
1976 and 1986
Canada

	1976				1986			
	Male		Female		Male		Female	
	'000	%	'000	%	'000	%	'000	%
Primary								
Agriculture	357	6.0	115	3.3	338	5.1	145	2.9
Other Primary	220	3.7	15	0.4	256	3.8	35	0.7
Total	577	9.7	130	3.7	594	8.9	180	3.6
Secondary								
Manufacturing	1,426	23.9	495	14.1	1,443	21.7	573	11.5
Construction	592	9.9	43	1.2	563	8.5	65	1.3
Total	2,018	33.8	538	15.3	2,006	30.1	638	12.8
Tertiary								
Transportation, Communication and other utilities	664	11.1	160	4.6	681	10.2	217	4.4
Trade	985	16.5	659	18.8	1,196	18.0	886	17.8
Finance, insurance and real estate	210	3.5	286	8.1	262	3.9	392	7.9
Community, business and personal service	1,050	17.6	1,523	43.4	1,435	21.6	2,348	47.2
Public Administration	460	7.7	218	6.2	483	7.3	316	6.3
Total	3,369	56.5	2,846	81.0	4,057	61.0	4,159	83.6
TOTAL	5,964	100.0	3,513	100.0	6,657	100.0	4,977	100.0

Source: Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Annual Averages 1975-1983*, Table 20; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 71.

Table 6

Job Creation, 1976-1986
Increases in Employment by Sector

	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	'000	% of jobs created	'000	% of jobs created	'000	% of jobs created
Primary						
Agriculture	-19	-2.7	+30	+2.0	+11	+0.5
Other Primary	+36	+5.2	+20	+1.4	+56	+2.6
Total	+17	+2.5	+50	+3.4	+67	+3.1
Secondary						
Manufacturing	+17	+2.5	+78	+5.3	+95	+4.4
Construction	-29	-4.2	+22	+1.5	-7	-0.3
Total	-12	-1.7	+100	+6.8	+88	+4.1
Tertiary						
Transportation, communication and other utilities	+17	+2.5	+57	+3.9	+74	+3.4
Trade	+211	+30.4	+227	+15.5	+438	+20.3
Finance, insurance and real estate	+52	+7.5	+106	+7.2	+158	+7.3
Community, business and personal service	+385	+55.6	+825	+56.4	+1,210	+56.1
Public Administration	+23	+3.3	+98	+6.7	+121	+5.6
Total	+688	+99.3	+1,313	+89.7	+2,001	+92.8
TOTAL	+693	100.0	+1,464	100.0	+2,157	100.0

Source: Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Annual Averages 1975-1983*, Table 21; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 71.

Note: Numbers may not add because of rounding.

Table 7

Growth in the Labour Force
1976-1986

	1976	1986	Increase 1976-86 %	Average Annual Increase %
Males				
Total population 15+ ('000)	8,207	9,576	+16.7	+1.7
Total labour force ('000)	6,368	7,347	+15.4	+1.5
Participation rate (%)	77.6	76.7	-1.2	-0.1
Females				
Total population 15+ ('000)	8,494	10,019	+18.0	+1.8
Total labour force ('000)	3,836	5,523	+44.0	+4.4
Participation rate (%)	45.2	55.1	+21 9	+2.2

Source: Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Annual Averages 1975-1983*, Table 1; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 55.

Table 8

Demographic Groups Within the Labour Force
1976 and 1986

	1976		1986	
	'000	%	'000	%
Youth (15-24)	2,740	26.9	2,850	22.1
Women (15+)	3,836	37.6	5,523	42.9
Prime-age males (25-54)	4,037	39.6	4,950	38.5
Older workers (55+)	1,194	11.7	1,342	10.4
Total Labour Force	10,203		12,870	

Source: Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Annual Averages 1975-1983*, Table 1; *The Labour Force* December 1986, Table 55.

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 because "youth" and "older workers" categories include females who are also included in "women" category.

Table 9

Changes in Female Employment, 1976-1986
('000)
(Full-time and part-time jobs, by age group)

Age group			Full-time	Part-time	Total	% of age group working part-time
15-19		1976	257	194	451	43.0
		1986	143	269	412	65.3
	% change	1976-86	-44.4	+38.7	-8.6	
20-24		1976	574	68	642	10.6
		1986	592	154	747	20.6
	% change	1976-86	+3.1	+126.5	+16.4	
25-34		1976	731	149	880	16.9
		1986	1,187	298	1,486	20.1
	% change	1976-86	+62.4	+100.0	+68.9	
35-44		1976	498	136	634	21.5
		1986	931	268	1,199	22.4
	% change	1976-86	+86.9	+97.1	+89.1	
45-54		1976	447	116	563	20.6
		1986	538	173	711	24.3
	% change	1976-86	+20.4	+49.1	+26.3	
55-64		1976	238	62	301	20.6
		1986	268	103	371	27.8
	% change	1976-86	+12.6	+66.1	+23.3	
65+		1976	24	15	43	34.9
		1986	28	23	51	45.1
	% change	1976-86	+16.7	+53.3	+18.6	
Total all ages		1976	2,773	741	3,513	21.1
		1986	3,688	1,290	4,977	25.9
	% change	1976-86	+33.0	+74.1	+41.7	

Source: Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey Division, unpublished data.

Table 10

Employment of Women by Occupation
1976 and 1986
(All classes of workers)

	1976		1986	
	'000	%	'000	%
Managerial, Administrative	130	3.7	471	9.5
Natural Sciences	31	0.9	66	1.3
Social Sciences	54	1.5	108	2.2
Religion	-	-	8	0.2
Teaching	241	6.9	311	6.2
Medicine and Health	324	9.2	451	9.1
Artistic and Recreational	39	1.1	81	1.6
Clerical	1,255	35.7	1,537	30.9
Sales	364	10.4	483	9.7
Service	588	16.7	882	17.7
Agriculture	112	3.2	125	2.5
Fishing, Hunting, Trapping	-	-	-	-
Forestry and Logging	-	-	-	-
Mining and Quarrying	-	-	-	-
Processing	66	1.9	74	1.5
Machining	15	0.4	15	0.3
Product Fabricating, Assembling and Repairing	203	5.8	223	4.5
Construction Trades	5	0.1	11	0.2
Transport Equipment Operation	15	0.4	30	0.6
Materials Handling	48	1.4	58	1.2
Other Crafts and Equipment Operating	20	0.6	37	0.7
All Occupations	3,513	100.0	4,977	100.0

Source: Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Annual Averages, 1975-1983*, Table 20; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 71.

Table 11

Fertility Rates and Labour Force Participation
1965 - 1986

	Total Fertility Rate	Participation Rate of Married Women 20-44
1965	3.11	
1966	2.75	29.3
1967	2.53	31.2
1968	2.39	32.8
1969	2.33	35.1
1970	2.26	36.2
1971	2.14	37.7
1972	1.98	39.2
1973	1.89	41.2
1974	1.84	43.1
1975	1.82	49.9 *
1976	1.80	50.9
1977	1.81	52.9
1978	1.76	56.0
1979	1.76	57.2
1980	1.75	59.4
1981	1.70	61.8
1982	1.69	62.8
1983	1.68	64.3
1984	1.69	66.4
1985	1.67	67.8
1986		70.4

* A change in the methodology of the labour force survey in 1975 may partly account for the increase from the previous year.

Source: Statistics Canada, Current Demographic Analysis, *Fertility in Canada: From Baby-boom to Baby-bust*, A. Romaniuc, November 1984, Table 1.2(a); *Births and Deaths*, Vital Statistics, Volume I, 1985, unpublished data from labour force survey division; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 56.

Table 12

Fertility, Labour Force Participation and Standard of Living
1965 - 1986

	GNP per capita (constant 1971 dollars)	% change	Total Fertility Rate	Female Part. Rate	% change	Part. Rate of Married Women 20-44	% change
1965	3,562		3.11	N/A		N/A	
1966	3,739	+ 5.0	2.75	35.4		29.3	
1967	3,795	+ 1.5	2.53	36.5	+ 2.8	31.2	+ 6.5
1968	3,955	+ 4.2	2.39	37.1	+ 1.6	32.8	+ 5.1
1969	4,106	+ 3.8	2.33	38.0	+ 2.4	35.1	+ 7.0
1970	4,150	+ 1.1	2.26	38.3	+ 0.8	36.2	+ 3.1
1971	4,379	+ 5.5	2.14	39.4	+ 2.9	37.7	+ 4.1
1972	4,598	+ 5.0	1.98	40.2	+ 2.0	39.2	+ 4.0
1973	4,891	+ 6.4	1.89	41.9	+ 4.2	41.2	+ 5.1
1974	4,994	+ 2.1	1.84	43.0	+ 2.6	43.1	+ 4.6
1975	4,979	- 0.3	1.82	44.4	+ 3.3	49.9	+15.8
1976	5,202	+ 4.5	1.80	45.2	+ 1.8	50.9	+ 2.0
1977	5,242	+ 0.8	1.81	46.0	+ 1.8	52.9	+ 3.9
1978	5,373	+ 2.5	1.76	47.9	+ 4.1	56.0	+ 5.9
1979	5,490	+ 2.2	1.76	49.0	+ 2.3	57.2	+ 2.1
1980	5,480	- 0.2	1.75	50.4	+ 2.9	59.4	+ 3.8
1981	5,591	+ 2.0	1.70	51.7	+ 2.6	61.8	+ 4.0
1982	5,280	- 5.6	1.69	51.7	---	62.8	+ 1.6
1983	5,399	+ 2.3	1.68	52.6	+ 1.7	64.3	+ 2.4
1984	5,597	+ 3.7	1.69	53.5	+ 1.7	66.4	+ 3.3
1985			1.67	54.3	+ 1.5	67.8	+ 2.1
1986				55.1	+ 1.5	70.4	+ 3.8

Source: Department of Finance, *Economic Review*, April 1985, Reference Table 4; Statistics Canada, *Post Censal Annual Estimates of Population*, June 1, 1985, Table 1; *Births and Deaths*, Vital Statistics, Volume I, 1985; *Historical Labour Force Statistics*, 1985, p. 255; unpublished data from labour force survey divison; *The Labour Force*, December 1985 and December 1986.

Table 13

Participation Rate of Women Aged 20-24 and 25-29, Selected Years United States

20-24		25-29	
1968	54.6	1973	51.8
1969	56.8	1974	54.8
1970	57.8	1975	57.1
1971	57.8	1976	59.3
1972	59.1	1977	61.8
1973	61.2	1978	64.3

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings*. (Cited in Dan Ciuriak and Harvey Sims, *Participation Rate and Labour Force Growth in Canada*, Department of Finance, April 1980, p. 20.)

Table 14

Labour Force Participation of Women by Age Groups, Selected Years Canada

15-24		25-34	
1966	48.4	1976	53.9
1967	49.1	1977	55.2
1968	49.8	1978	59.0
1969	50.2	1979	60.4
1970	49.5	1980	62.7
1971	50.8	1981	65.5
1972	51.8	1982	65.6
1973	54.2	1983	67.6
1974	56.0	1984	69.1
1975	56.8	1985	70.7
1976	53.9	1986	73.0

Source: Statistics Canada, *Historical Labour Force Statistics*, 1985, p. 255; *Labour Force Annual Averages 1975-1983*, Table 13; *The Labour Force*, December 1984, Table 57A; *The Labour Force*, December 1985, Table 55; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 55.

Table 15

Fertility Rates and Labour Force Participation in Socialist Countries, compared with Canada, U.S. and France 1980

	Labour Force Participation for Females of Productive Age[1]	Total Fertility Rates
Bulgaria	78.2[2]	2.20
Cuba[6]	28.1[2]	1.60
Czechoslovakia	82.0[3]	2.10
Hungary[4]	74.6	1.92
Poland[4]	79.3[5]	2.30
Uzbek SSR	--	4.80[7]
Canada	58.0	1.75
France	53.0	2.00
United States	61.0	1.90

1. The productive age group for women in the six Socialist Countries is 15 (or 16) - 54 (or 55) years, except for Poland where it is 18-60 years.
   Participation rates shown for Canada, France and U.S. refer to women aged 15-64 and are for 1981.
2. Data for 1979.
3. Includes approximately 9 per cent on child care leave.
4. In Hungary and Poland, women on child care leave are considered to be inactive. In 1980, of the women of productive age, such women constituted about 8 per cent in Hungary and about 1 per cent in Poland.
5. Data for 1978.
6. Labour force participation rates are for all women aged 15 years or above.
7. 1980-81.

Sources: Valentina Bodrova and Richard Anker, *Working Women in Socialist Countries: The Fertility Connection*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1985, Table 1, p. 3 and Table 5, p. 12: Monica Townson, *The Labour Force Participation of Women in the ECE Region*, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, September 1984, Table 6, p. 9; Statistics Canada, *Fertility in Canada: From Baby-boom to Baby-bust*, A. Romaniuc, November 1984, Table 1.2(a).

Table 16

Reasons for Part-time Work
1976 and 1986

	Total Working Part-time	Reasons for Part-time Employment				
		Personal or family responsibilities	Going to school	Could only find part-time work	Did not want full-time work	Other reasons
	'000	%	%	%	%	%
Men						
1976						
Married	68	--	13.2	14.7	42.6	26.5
Single	230	--	75.2	12.2	9.6	2.6
Other	7	--	--	--	--	--
Total	306	1.3	59.8	12.7	17.6	8.5
1986						
Married	128	--	7.8	41.4	39.1	9.4
Single	379	--	64.6	26.9	6.9	1.1
Other	14	--	--	42.9	42.9	--
Total	520	--	49.2	31.0	15.6	3.3
Women						
1976						
Married	460	25.6	1.5	10.0	59.6	3.3
Single	234	1.7	68.4	14.1	13.2	2.6
Other	46	15.2	--	17.4	56.5	8.7
Total	741	17.4	22.8	11.6	44.7	3.4
1986						
Married	801	19.0	1.6	25.2	53.1	1.1
Single	411	1.0	59.6	28.2	10.0	1.2
Other	78	6.4	5.1	44.9	41.0	--
Total	1,290	12.5	20.3	27.4	38.5	1.2

Source: Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Annual Averages 1975-1983*, Table 32; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 83.

Table 17

Population Characteristics of Women in Husband-Wife Families (and heads of other families) by Characteristics of the Husband and by Presence of Own Children 1976 and 1986

	Labour Force '000	Participation Rate %	Employed full-time '000	Employed part-time '000	Percentage Working part-time %
Canada 1976					
Husband employed	2,001	47.4	1,434	420	22.7
Youngest child under 3	249	31.7	146	72	33.0
Youngest child aged 3-5	211	39.9	131	61	31.8
Youngest child aged 6-15	657	50.1	448	164	26.8
Without children under 16	884	55.5	709	124	14.9
Husband unemployed	201	21.4	144	30	17.2
Youngest child under 3	19	30.4	12	--	--
Youngest child aged 3-5	16	40.3	11	--	--
Youngest child aged 6-15	41	36.4	29	6	17.1
Without children under 16	125	17.2	92	19	17.1
No husband present	247	47.2	197	30	13.2
Youngest child under 3	14	33.6	9	--	--
Youngest child aged 3-5	28	51.5	20	4	16.7
Youngest child aged 6-15	101	58.7	80	13	14.0
Without children under 16	104	40.7	88	11	11.1
All families	2,556	43.8	1,872	482	20.5
Youngest child under 3	285	31.9	170	76	30.9
Youngest child aged 3-5	260	41.3	166	67	28.8
Youngest child aged 6-15	825	50.7	582	182	23.8
Without children under 16	1,186	44.1	954	157	14.1
Canada 1986					
Husband employed	2,942	65.7	1,995	713	26.3
Youngest child under 3	452	58.4	263	141	34.9
Youngest child aged 3-5	298	62.7	179	90	33.5
Youngest child aged 6-15	846	69.2	550	229	29.4
Without children under 16	1,347	67.1	1,002	253	20.2
Husband unemployed	392	26.9	251	77	23.5
Youngest child under 3	44	48.2	25	8	24.2
Youngest child aged 3-5	29	55.4	17	5	22.7
Youngest child aged 6-5	77	56.4	49	14	22.2
Without children under 16	242	20.6	160	50	23.8
No husband present	431	55.2	312	57	15.4
Youngest child under 3	33	41.6	17	6	26.1
Youngest child aged 3-5	50	59.7	33	6	15.4
Youngest child aged 6-15	173	70.7	123	23	15.8
Without children under 16	175	46.9	139	22	13.7
All families	3,765	56.1	2,558	847	24.9
Youngest child under 3	529	56.0	305	155	33.7
Youngest child aged 3-5	377	61.7	229	101	30.6
Youngest child aged 6-15	1,096	68.4	722	266	26.9
Without children under 16	1,763	49.6	1,302	325	20.0

Source: Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey Division, unpublished data (1976); *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 61A.

Table 18

Availability of Child Care and Labour Force Participation
1975 - 1986

	Number of licenced child care spaces (centres and homes)	Number of mothers of pre-school children working full-time	Labour force participation rate of mothers of pre-school children	Shortfall of licenced spaces (col. 2 - col. 1) (to nearest '000)
	1	2	%	
1975	69,952	333,000	35.1	263,000
1976	83,520	336,000	35.8	252,000
1977	81,651	350,000	37.6	268,000
1978	82,279	370,000	41.3	288,000
1979	93,852	399,000	42.9	305,000
1980	109,141	420,000	45.2	311,000
1981	N/A	439,000	47.7	--
1982	123,962	444,000	48.8	320,000
1983	139,070	457,000	51.7	318,000
1984	171,654	484,000	53.6	312,000
1985	192,374	520,000	56.1	328,000
1986	220,517	535,000	58.2	314,000
Increase 1976-86 %	+164.0	+59.2	+62.6	

Source: Health and Welfare Canada, National Day Care Information Centre, *Status of Day Care in Canada*, (annual publication); Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey Division, unpublished data (1975-1983); *The Labour Force*, December 1984, Table 65A; *The Labour Force*, December 1985, Table 61A; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 61A.

Table 19

Children Receiving Licenced Child Care Services
1984

Age of Children	Estimate of need	Number of licenced spaces	Percentage of children served
Children aged 0-17 months	133,000	11,622	8.7
Children aged 18-35 months	166,000	22,981	13.8
Children aged 3 and under 6	334,000	104,598	31.3
Children aged 6 and under 13	1,317,000	32,453	2.5
Total for Canada	1,950,000	171,654	8.8

Source: *Report of the Task Force on Child Care*, Status of Women Canada, March 1986, Table 3.4, p. 51.

Table 20

Family income of husband-and-wife families with young children and labour force participation of wives 1984

	Families with children under 6 years		Families without children under 6 years	
	Wife in labour force	Wife not in labour force	Wife in labour force	Wife not in labour force
Average husband's income	$26,341	$27,307	$26,872	$23,051
Median husband's income	$25,398	$26,928	$24,700	$18,711
Average family income	$40,537	$28,974	$44,998	$29,964

Source: Statistics Canada, *Income Distributions by Size in Canada*, 1984, Table 25.

Table 21

Women's Labour Force Participation by Age and Marital Status 1976 and 1986

Marital Status		Age groups			
		15-24 %	25-54 %	20-44 %	45-64 %
Single	1976	56.3	82.8	81.0	66.2
	1986	63.6	84.2	81.8	61.0
Married	1976	58.1	47.7	50.9	37.2
	1986	72.0	67.3	70.4	45.9
Other	1976	54.1	63.9	64.9	48.7
	1986	63.6	71.6	74.2	49.1
All women	1976	56.8	52.1	57.2	41.0
	1986	65.6	69.8	73.4	47.4

Source: Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Annual Averages*, 1975-1983, Table 3; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 56.

Table 22

Employment of Married Women
1976 and 1986

Age group			Full-time	Part-time	total	Percentage employed part-time
			'000	'000	'000	%
15-19		1976	34	7	41	17.1
		1986	15	6	20	30.0
	% change		-55.9	-14.3	-51.2	
20-24		1976	267	35	302	11.6
		1986	227	53	280	18.9
	% change		-15.0	+51.4	-7.3	
25-34		1976	507	136	643	21.1
		1986	794	252	1,046	24.1
	% change		+56.6	+85.3	+62.7	
35-44		1976	381	127	508	25.0
		1986	698	243	941	25.8
	% change		+83.2	+91.3	+85.2	
45-54		1976	319	105	423	24.8
		1986	394	153	547	28.0
	% change		+23.5	+45.7	+29.3	
55-64		1976	130	45	175	25.7
		1986	164	81	245	33.1
	% change		+26.2	+80.0	+40.0	
65+		1976	9	5	14	35.7
		1986	11	13	24	54.2
	% change		+22.2	+160.0	+71.4	
TOTAL		1976	1,647	460	2,106	21.8
		1986	2,303	801	3,103	25.8
	% change		+39.8	+74.1	+47.3	

Source: Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Annual Averages* 1975-1983, Table 29; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 80; Labour Force Survey Division, unpublished data.

Table 23

Labour Force Activity of Women Aged 45-64
1976 and 1986

	'000	Single	Married	Other	Total
Total Population	1976	151	1,705	365	2,220
	1986	139	1,853	473	2,465
% increase		-7.9	+8.7	+29.6	+11.0
Labour Force	1976	100	633	178	911
	1986	85	851	232	1,168
% increase		-15.0	+34.4	+30.3	+28.2
Employed Full-time	1976	92	449	144	685
	1986	71	558	177	806
% increase		-22.8	+24.3	+22.9	+17.7
Employed Part-time	1976	5	150	24	178
	1986	8	234	34	276
% increase		+60.0	+56.0	+41.7	+55.1
Percentage working	1976	5.2	25.0	14.3	20.6
Part-time	1986	10.1	29.5	16.1	25.5
Participation rate	1976	66.2	37.2	48.7	41.0
(%)	1986	61.0	45.9	49.1	47.4
% increase		-7.9	+23.4	+0.8	+15.6
Not in Labour Force	1976	51	1,072	187	1,310
	1986	54	1,002	241	1,297
% change		+5.9	-6.5	+28.9	-1.0

Source: Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Annual Averages* 1975-1983, Table 3; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 56; Labour Force Survey Divison, unpublished data.

Table 24

Participation Rates of Women by Educational Attainment 1976 and 1986

	1976	1986
	%	%
0-8 years of school	25.5	25.2
High school	47.9	55.9
Some post-secondary	54.0	67.2
Post-secondary certificate or diploma	59.8	70.9
University degree	67.0	78.0

Source: Statistics Canada, *Labour Force Annual Averages*, 1975-1983, Table 8; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 59.

Table 25

Divorce Rates and Labour Force Participation
1970 - 1986

	Number of Divorces per 100,000 Married Women aged 15+	Participation Rate of Married Women Aged 20-44
		%
1970	621	36.2
1971	607	37.7
1972	650	39.2
1973	716	41.2
1974	860	43.1
1975	942	49.9
1976	986	50.9
1977	994	52.9
1978	1,016	56.0
1979	1,050	57.2
1980	1,085	59.4
1981	1,129	61.8
1932	1,164	62.8
1983	1,125	64.3
1984	1,062	66.4
1985	1,004	67.8
1986		70.4

Source: Statistics Canada, *Divorce, Law and the Family in Canada*, D.C. McKie, B. Prentice and P. Reed, February 1983, Table 1, p. 62; *Marriages and Divorces*, Vital Statistics - Volume II, 1985; Labour Force Survey Division, unpublished data; *Labour Force Annual Averages* 1975-1983, Table 3; *The Labour Force*, December 1984, Table 58; December 1985, Table 56; December 1986, Table 56.

Table 26

Births, Marriages and Divorces and Women's Labour Force Participation in Canada

	Births per 10,000 population	Marriages per 10,000 population	Divorces per 10,000 population	Labour Force Participation of Married Women		
				Aged 20-24	25-44	45-64
1966	194	78	5	34.6	28.3	27.4
1967	182	81	5	37.5	29.9	28.7
1968	176	83	5	42.4	30.7	29.7
1969	176	87	12	44.7	33.0	29.8
1970	175	88	14	44.1	34.4	30.7
1971	168	89	14	47.2	35.5	31.0
1972	159	92	15	47.7	37.3	31.4
1973	155	90	17	50.8	39.1	32.6
1974	156	89	20	51.8	41.2	32.6
1975	158	87	22	49.9		35.4
1976	157	84	23	50.9		37.2
1977	155	80	24	52.9		37.9
1978	153	79	24	56.0		39.2
1979	155	79	25	57.2		40.1
1980	155	80	26	59.4		41.2
1981	153	78	28	61.8		42.4
1982	151	76	29	62.6		42.7
1983	150	74	28	64.3		44.0
1984	150	74	26	66.4		44.1
1985	148	73	24	67.8		45.6
1986				70.4		45.9

Note: Labour Force Survey methodology was changed in 1975, separate categories not available after this date.

Source: Alice Nakamura and Masao Nakamura, "A Survey of Research on the Work Behaviour of Canadian Women" in *Work and Pay: The Canadian Labour Market*, W. Craig Riddell, Research Co-ordinator, University of Toronto Press, 1985, p. 201; Statistics Canada, *Marriages and Divorces*, Vital Statistics Volume II, 1985; *Births and Deaths*, Vital Statistics Volume I, Table 1; Labour Force Survey Division unpublished data; *Labour Force Annual Averages 1975-1983*, Table 3; *The Labour Force*, December 1984, Table 58; *The Labour Force*, December 1985, Table 56; *The Labour Force*, December 1986, Table 56.